Quantification, degrees, and beyond in Navajo

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Abstract

This paper explores the interaction of degree and quantification in Navajo. We argue that Navajo comparative standard markers should be analyzed as quantifiers over degrees ([(d, t), (d, t), t]) despite the language apparently only allowing phrasal (non-clausal) standards of comparison. Our primary evidence comes from novel exploration of translations of superlative prompts in Navajo, which involve the combination of a comparative standard marker and an existential affix that obligatorily takes lowest scope, a configuration which our analysis of standard markers makes possible. We develop a compositional analysis that resolves the quantificational meanings of standard markers with non-clausal standards. By positing degree quantifiers in Navajo, we challenge earlier analyses which took Navajo to lack expressions of quantificational determiner type. We posit that such meanings exist only in the domain of degrees because degree arguments are the only type of argument position in Navajo not obligatorily saturated by verbal prefixes.

1 Introduction

Intuitively, the comparison of objects along a gradient dimension seems like a cognitively basic ability that should be universally available and communicable (Sapir 1944). However, we also find great diversity in the kinds of structures that individual languages use to express these meanings (Stassen 1985). Recent crosslinguistic investigation has found that even in languages that use rather similar morphosyntactic strategies to express comparison and related meaning, the semantics and syntax of structures in individual languages diverge in subtle, but still perceptible, ways (see, for example, Beck et al. 2004, 2009; Kennedy 2007; Bochmak 2015, and Rett’s contribution to this volume).

A particularly rich line of investigation has probed the syntax of standards of comparison and its interplay with the semantics of the comparative marker (Hoeksema 1983; Heim 1985; Kennedy 1997; Lechner 2004; Pancheva 2006; Bhatt & Takahashi 2011; Beck et al. 2012). In terms of syntax, the key question is whether the standard of comparison contains elided clausal structure in cases where it is not visible. Since Bresnan (1973), it has been usual to analyze sentences like (1) as containing an unpronounced instance of the adjective in the main clause.

(1) Alice is taller than [CP Ben is tall].

Acknowledgements and glosses.
This kind of syntax of generally paired with a semantic analysis that treats comparative morphemes like -er as quantificational expressions on par with every. Both compose with two property-type expressions, but where every composes with two sets of entities (2), -er instead composes with sets of degrees (3) (von Stechow 1984; Heim 2001; Beck 2011, among many others).

(2) \(\text{every} \sim \lambda P_{(e,t)} \cdot \lambda Q_{(e,t)} \cdot \forall x . P(x) \Rightarrow Q(x)\) \((\{e,t\}, \{(e,t), t\})\)

(3) \(-er \sim \lambda D_{(d,t)} \cdot \lambda D'_{(d,t)} \cdot \text{MAX}(D') > \text{MAX}(D)\) \((\{d,t\}, \{(d,t), t\})\)

Applied to (1), the two sets of degrees \((D, D')\) taken as argument by more/-er correspond respectively to the degrees to which Ben is tall, and the degrees to which Alice is tall.

In a sentence like (4), by contrast, the standard lacks any overt clausal material. While there is debate as to the analysis of such strings (see e.g. Lechner 2004; Bhatt & Takahashi 2011), one strategy is to treat the standard of comparison as denoting an entity rather than a set of degrees, and lacking in any hidden clausal structure (Hoeksema 1983; Heim 1985; Kennedy 1997).

(4) Alice is taller than \([DP \text{Ben}]\).

More recent crosslinguistic investigation has argued that this ‘phrasal’ analysis alone is available for standards of comparison in Mandarin, Japanese, Turkish, Hindi-Urdu, and Luganda (Xiang 2005; Kennedy 2007; Pancheva 2006; Hofstetter 2009; Bhatt & Takahashi 2011; Beck et al. 2012).

A phrasal syntax for the standard of comparison is most often paired with a semantic analysis which does not treat more/-er and its reflexes in other languages as a quantifier. Instead, it composes directly with two entities \((x, y)\) and a gradable predicate \((g)\) determined by the adjective in the main clause. While the sentence in (4) would have the same truth conditions as its clausal counterpart in (1), these truth conditions would be derived differently.\(^2\)

(5) \(-er \sim \lambda y_e . \lambda g_{(d,et)} \cdot \lambda x_e . \text{MAX}(\lambda d . g(x,d)) > \text{MAX}(\lambda d . g(y,d))\) \((\{e\}, \{(e, t), \{e, t\}\})\) (Heim 1985)

This paper considers data from Navajo degree constructions like those in (6) which challenge this pairing of syntactic and semantic analyses. While Navajo seems to be a clear case of a language with syntactically phrasal standards of comparison, we argue that it is nevertheless a language for which a quantificational semantics for comparative morphemes (or, as in Navajo, standard markers) is nevertheless motivated.

(6) a. Alice Ben yi-lááh \(\text{tánìmìì̀éez.}\)
   ‘Alice is taller than Ben.’

\(^2\) While these analyses have been widely-adopted and will be the focus of our paper, they are by no means the only analyses that have proposed for comparatives; see in particular Bale (this volume) and Schwarzschild (this volume) for two recent alternative proposals.
b. Alice 'a-lááh unspec-obj-beyond 3subj.tall

‘Alice is tallest, Alice is taller than anyone.’

While a non-quantificational meaning for the comparative standard marker -lááh ‘beyond’ would suffice in (6-a), the meaning of (6-b) motivates us to posit (only) a quantificational meaning for -lááh. Superlative prompts are translated in Navajo by combination of the standard marker with the ‘unspecified’ object marker 'a-. This type of strategy for expressing superlative meaning is crosslinguistically quite rare [Gorshenin 2012]. We demonstrate that unless -lááh is given a quantificational meaning, we predict 'a- to have scope over the comparative relation, giving rise to an unattested interpretation in which Alice need only be taller than a particular individual.

This paper addresses the interaction of quantification and degree in three ways. First, it provides evidence from a structure with a quantificational standard of comparison ('a- in (6-b)) for a quantificational meaning for Navajo standard markers. Second, it considers how a phrasal syntax can be reconciled with a quantificational entry for comparative morphemes. We accomplish this by invoking application of a measurement operator to the standard. Third, it presents evidence that the Navajo lexicon includes expressions of quantificational determiner type $\tau,t$, in the domain of degrees. Navajo has generally been viewed as a language without meanings of this type [Faltz 1995; 2000; Speas & Parsons-Yazzie 1996]. We suggest that Navajo allows this type of meaning in the domain of degrees because unlike entity arguments of verbs more generally, the degree arguments of gradable expressions are not saturated by morphology on the verb itself, thus leaving property-type expressions available to compose with quantifiers.

2 Background

Navajo expresses gradable properties using verbs. While somewhat less morphologically complex than event-denoting verbs in Navajo, adjectival verbs such as those below still bear key morphological components otherwise associated with verbs, including a stem and a subject prefix:

(7) a. 'ánílnéez 3subj.tall
    b. 'ánísnéez 1subj.tall
    c. nineez 3subj.tall
    d. deesdoi 3subj.hot
    e. nohzhóní 2pl._subj.pretty

All Navajo verbs obligatorily bear prefixes to mark core nominal participants (subject, object). Adjectival verbs bear only a subject marker. As with all verbs, when the subject (or object, where relevant) is third person, a verb-external nominal expression can be optionally included.

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For much more detail on the topics discussed here, see [Bogal-Allbritten 2013a; 2016].
(8) (Alice) nineez.
   Alice 3SUBJ.tall
   ‘Alice (he, she, it) is tall.’

Bogal-Allbritten (2013a, 2016) discusses at length differences in degree constructions that correlate with the morphological marking borne by adjectival verbs, e.g. ‘áníłnééz vs. nineez in (9). We follow Bogal-Allbritten (2013a, 2016) in taking these differences to have syntactic, rather than semantic, sources. These differences will largely not be important for our purposes here and will only be mentioned when they are salient or useful to note.

Following Bogal-Allbritten (2013a, 2016), we treat all adjectival verbs in Navajo as denoting, at an abstract level, relations between entities and degrees, as is familiar from analyses of gradable predicates in English (Cresswell 1976; von Stechow 1984; Heim 1985, 2001; Kennedy & McNally 2005, and many others).

(9)     \[\text{tall} \rightarrow \lambda x.\lambda d. \text{height}(x) \geq d \equiv \lambda x.\lambda d. \text{tall}(x,d)\]

Navajo verbs cannot appear without prefixes for all nominal arguments in place, however. We suggest that the denotation in (9), then, does not actually correspond to a verb form that can be pronounced in the language. The verb’s entity argument is saturated by the third-person pronominal subject prefix, which we treat as a pronoun, indicated with subscript \(i\), translated as a variable with the same index \(v_i\). An adjectival verb as a whole denotes an expression of type \(d, t\).

(10)    ‘áníłnééz\(i\) 
       3SUBJ.tall
       \[\sim \lambda d. \text{height}(v_i) \geq d \equiv \lambda d. \text{tall}(v_i, d)\]

This view of Navajo verbs is consistent with analyses that take it to be a Pronominal Argument language, in which all nominal arguments of the verb are pronouns realized as morphologically dependent affixes on the verb (Jelinek, 1984; Baker, 1996; Willie & Jelinek, 2000; Hale, 2001). Verb-external nominal expressions do not themselves saturate the verb’s argument positions but instead come to corefer with the pronominal prefixes through a binding process that we might think of as similar to clitic left dislocation in Romance (Baker, 1996). The details of this process will not be critical to us. What is important is the typical verbs like in (11) do not denote relations of type \(e, t\) or \(e, e, t\) but are instead treated like complete clauses would be (type \(t\)).

(11)    Yiyíýáų\(^1\).
       3OBJ.3SUBJ.eat.PERF
       ‘S/he/it ate it.’

\(^4\)We note that it’s more typical to treat adjectives as denoting \(d, e, t\) expressions. We reverse the entity and degree arguments since we assume here the entity argument is obligatorily saturated first by verb-internal morphology in Navajo. The treatment in (9) is furthermore consistent with independent proposals for adjectival meaning in other languages, in particular Schwarzschild (2005) (Jessica Rett, p.c.).

\(^5\)Bogal-Allbritten (2016) suggests this to be the entry for the adjectival verb stems, which is the rightmost morpheme in the verb.

\(^6\)We place the index for the third-person subject prefix at the right edge of the verb in (10) as we are not showing the full morphological breakdown for these verbs here. The actual prefix would come towards the middle of the verb word.
We propose here that the key difference between ordinary verbs and adjectival verbs is that while the first express sentential meanings once fully inflected, adjectival verbs denote functions of type \( \langle d, t \rangle \) since there does not exist an equivalent to subject and object prefixes in the domain of degrees.

We will be concerned with the semantics of elements found in Navajo degree constructions. In contrast with English, Navajo does not have both degree morphemes (e.g. more/-er, less, as) and standard markers (e.g. than, as). Instead, Navajo only uses standard markers to express comparative meaning. The standard markers are shown in bold below.

The comparative standard marker -lááh is the primary focus of discussion below, although all claims should be extendible to the other standard markers shown.

(12) Alice (Ben) yi-lááh 'áníñnéez.
    Alice Ben 3OBJ-beyond 3SUBJ.tall
    ‘Alice is taller than Ben/him/her/it.’ [Comparison of superiority]

(13) Alice shi-‘oh 'áníñnéez.
    Alice 1OBJ-short.of 3SUBJ.tall
    ‘Alice is less tall than me.’ [Comparison of inferiority]

(14) Alice (Ben) y-ee-níñnéez.
    Alice Ben 3OBJ-with 3SUBJ.tall
    ‘Alice is as tall as Ben/him/her/it.’ [Equative, postpositional]

(15) Alice Ben-gi 'áníñnéez.
    Alice Ben-at 3SUBJ.tall
    ‘Alice is as tall as Ben.’ [Equative, enclitic]

The Navajo standard markers shown above belong to two different morphosyntactic categories. Postpositions function as the comparative morphemes in comparisons of superiority (12), comparisons of inferiority (13), and the equative structure shown in (14). Postpositions in Navajo obligatorily bear object markers which indicate the person features of the object of the postposition, e.g. yi- (3OBJ) in (12) and (14) and shi- (1OBJ) in (13). The standard marker in the equative construction in (15) is an enclitic which attaches to the independent nominal expression serving as the standard of comparison. Regardless of the category of the standard marker, the standard of comparison can never be omitted:

(16) a. *Alice lááh 'áníñnéez.
    Alice beyond 3SUBJ.tall
    (Intended: Alice is taller, Alice is taller than that)

b. *Alice gi 'áníñnéez.
    Alice at 3SUBJ.tall
    (Intended: Alice is as tall, Alice is as tall as that)

While all postpositional standard markers necessarily bear pronominal object marking, an additional expression can be added to provide more information about third-person standards of comparison. This additional expression can be a proper name is in the examples.

\footnote{There are other degree constructions in Navajo which will not concern us here. See \cite{BogalAllbritten2013a, BogalAllbritten2016} for discussion.}
above. It can also be a measure phrase:

\[(17)\]

\[\text{a. Alice } \text{hastá } '\text{adées'eez yi-lááh } '\text{áníltso.}\]
\[\text{Alice six } \text{feet } \text{3OBJ-beyond } \text{3SUBJ.big}\]
\[\text{‘Alice is taller than six feet.’}\]

\[\text{b. Díí } \text{bikáá'adání } \text{hastá } '\text{adées'eez-gi } '\text{ánílnééz.}\]
\[\text{this table six feet-at } \text{3SUBJ.long}\]
\[\text{‘This table is six feet long.’}\]

In addition, Navajo has a subcomparative construction in which the standard of comparison contains clausal material. In structures like (18), the clausal material in the standard is obligatorily marked by -ígíí, also found in internally-headed relative clauses in the language (Platero 1974; Willie 1989; Grosu 2012). We return to the analysis of subcomparatives in section 5.2.

\[(18)\]

\[\text{Ch'é'étiin } [\text{bikáá'adání } '\text{ánílnééz-ígíí}] \text{ yi-lááh } '\text{áníltéél.}\]
\[\text{door table 3SUBJ.long-NMLZ 3OBJ-beyond 3SUBJ.wide}\]
\[\text{‘The door is wider than the table is long.’}\]

Finally, it should be noted that the glosses given to each standard marker reflect the fact that none is only found in degree constructions. Their glosses reflect their meaning elsewhere in the language. For instance, -lááh can describe motion or position beyond some point in space, named by the object of the postposition. In these ‘literal’ uses, postpositions are frequently accompanied by additional locative markers such as -dí in (19-a), but this is not obligatory (19-b).

\[(19)\]

\[\text{a. Tooh úlnígíí } \text{bi-láah-di } \text{shighan si'á.}\]
\[\text{water 3SUBJ.extend.NMLZ 3OBJ-beyond-LOC 1POSS.hogan 3SUBJ.sit}\]
\[\text{‘My place is over beyond the river.’}\]
\[\text{(Young & Morgan 1987, 222)}\]

\[\text{b. Kó yee naagháhí dzíí } \text{bi-láah-go } \text{sh-il } \text{dah}\]
\[\text{balloon mountain 3OBJ-beyond-SUB 1OBJ-with up}\]
\[\text{díido.}\]
\[\text{3SUBJ.fly.PERF}\]
\[\text{‘My balloon went flying up with me beyond the mountains.’}\]
\[\text{(Young & Morgan 1987, 342)}\]

This paper will not discuss how one might reconcile the entries that we give for standard markers with the use of the same expressions to convey various other types of meaning. For discussion of connections between comparative and locative meaning in particular in general, we refer the reader to Hohaus 2012. For discussion of this issue with particular respect to Navajo, see Schwarzschild 2012, 2014.
3 Clausal and phrasal analyses of comparatives

3.1 Overview

There are two major approaches to a sentence with the shape in (20), both for English and for its counterparts in other languages. The key feature of (20) is that the standard appears to consist only of DP $Ben$.

(20) Alice is taller than Ben.

One analysis of sentences like (20) is that the standard of comparison contains a clause which has been largely elided (Bresnan, 1973; von Stechow, 1984; Hackl, 2000; Lechner, 2004; Bhatt & Takahashi, 2011), as in (21).

(21) Alice is taller than $[CP \text{ Ben is tall}]$.

This is the same kind of syntax as is given to standards with overt clausal structure:

(22) a. This table is longer than $[CP \text{ the door is wide}]$.

b. Alice is taller than $[CP \text{ Ben is tall}]$.

A clausal syntax for the standard is most commonly paired with a semantic analysis of comparative and other degree morphemes as quantifiers over degrees (type $\langle d, t \rangle$, $\langle d, t \rangle$, $\langle d, t \rangle$). The entry in (23) for $\text{-er}$ is based on proposals by Cresswell (1976). The two properties of degrees taken as argument are both maximalized by the comparative morpheme such that comparison is ultimately between the maximal degrees in each set. Motivation for addition of maximalization comes from von Stechow (1984) and Rullmann (1995).

(23) $-er_{\text{clausal}} \rightarrow \lambda(D_{(d, t)} \cdot \lambda(D'_{(d, t)}) \cdot \max(D') > \max(D)$

where $\max(D) \rightarrow \lambda(D_{(d, t)} \cdot \text{ud} \cdot D(d) \& \forall d' [D(d') \rightarrow d' \leq d]$

The comparative morpheme takes as argument two sets of degrees: one contributed by the standard phrase and the other contributed by the main clause. The following LF is based on von Stechow (1984), as given by Beck et al. (2012).

(24) $[-er_{\text{clausal}} \text{ than } [\lambda d_1 [\text{Ben is } d_1 \text{ tall}][[\lambda d_2 [\text{Alice is } d_2 \text{ tall}]]]]$

As an aside, the proposals above have been criticized for English because all semantic work is done by $\text{more/-er}$ while $\text{than}$ is vacuous. von Stechow (1984) and Rullmann (1995) suggest an alternative in which maximalization over the standard of comparison is

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*Alternative entries that are also of quantifier type include the following:

(i) a. $-er_{\text{clausal}} \rightarrow \lambda(D_{(d, t)} \cdot \lambda(D'_{(d, t)} \cdot \exists d \cdot D'(d) \& \neg D(d))$

b. $-er_{\text{clausal}} \rightarrow \lambda(D_{(d, t)} \cdot \lambda(D'_{(d, t)} \cdot D \subset D')$

Nothing about the claims made in the rest of this paper should change if either of these denotations is substituted for any instance of a comparative morpheme with the denotation in (23).

9 Abstraction over degree arguments in each clause is necessitated by the assumption that gradable predicates in English are expressions of type $\langle d, (e, t) \rangle$. The LF will be simpler in Navajo since we take inflected adjectival verbs to already denote expressions of type $\langle d, t \rangle$. 7
is accomplished by *than*, so that the comparative morpheme instead composes with a single degree followed by a property of degrees. Other approaches in this vein assign maximalization to a *wh*-operator and treat the standard as a free relative of degrees à la Partee (1987) and Jacobson (1995).

\[(25) \begin{align*}
& a. \quad -er_{\text{clausal}} \leadsto \lambda d_d \cdot \lambda D_{(d,t)} \cdot \text{MAX}(D) > d \\
& b. \quad \text{than} \leadsto \lambda D_{(d,t)} \cdot \text{MAX}(D)
\end{align*}\]

While entries like (25) may be a good fit for a language like English, Navajo does not have separate comparative morphemes and standard markers. Thus, there is no overt element in Navajo to which we might wish to treat as a separate maximality operator. Thus, when we consider the analysis of Navajo, we will focus on entries like (23)/(26) in which all meaning is contributed by a single morpheme, and where two sets of degrees are taken as argument.

\[(26) -l\ddot{a}\text{h}_{\text{clausal}} \leadsto \lambda D_{(d,t)} \cdot \lambda D'_{(d,t)} \cdot \text{MAX}(D') > \text{MAX}(D)\]

Precedent for an entry like (26) for a standard marker comes from Alrenga et al. (2012), who observe that it is very common to find languages using only a standard marker to express comparative meanings.

The second major approach to the string in (20) treats the standard not as a reduced clause but instead as just a DP.

\[(27) \text{Alice is taller than } [D_P \text{Ben}].\]

While this syntactic analysis has been long debated for English (Heim, 1985; Kennedy, 1997; Lechner, 2004; Bhatt & Takahashi, 2011), it has also been put forth for several other languages; see Xiang (2005) for Mandarin, Kennedy (2007) for Japanese, Hofstetter (2009) for Turkish, Bhatt & Takahashi (2011) for Hindi-Urdu, and Bochnak (2013) for Luganda.

The syntax in (27) is compatible with the following denotation for *-er*. This entry is taken from Heim (1985); see Beck et al. (2012) for comparison of it with an alternative from Kennedy (1997).

\[(28) -er_{\text{phrasal}} \leadsto \lambda y_e \cdot \lambda g_{(d,et)} \cdot \lambda x_e \cdot \text{MAX}(\lambda d \cdot g(x, d)) > \text{MAX}(\lambda d \cdot g(y, d))\]

Under this account, the comparative morpheme does not take as argument two sets of degrees, but instead composes with two entities (or one entity and one degree) and a gradable predicate (type \(\{e, \{d, (e, t)^i\}, (e, t)^i, (e, t)^i, (e, t)^i\}\)). As formulated here, the comparative relation still holds between the maximal degrees in two sets of degrees, but the sets of degrees are derived directly by *more/-er*.

As before, an account of Navajo on these lines would assign the meaning of *more/-er* to the standard marker *-l\ddot{a}\text{h}*. An entry of this kind is attributed to standard markers by Bhatt & Takahashi (2011) in their analysis of Hindi-Urdu.

\[(29) -l\ddot{a}\text{h}_{\text{phrasal}} \leadsto \lambda y_e \cdot \lambda g_{(d,et)} \cdot \lambda x_e \cdot \text{MAX}(\lambda d \cdot g(x, d)) > \text{MAX}(\lambda d \cdot g(y, d))\]

Not all analyses correspond fully to either of the two pairings described above. Of
particular note for us is Pancheva’s (2006) proposal that Slavic standards of the shape in
(30) neither originate as DPs nor derived from full clauses, but are instead derived from
reduced small clauses (31). (See also Pancheva 2010 for a development of this account.)

(30) *Germann* byl sil’nee [SC svoego protivnika]
\[ \text{Germann}\text{\textsubscript{nom}} \text{was} \text{stronger} \text{\textsubscript{gen}} \text{own adversary} \]
‘Germann was stronger than his adversary.’ (Pancheva, 2006, (10b))

(31) a. Alice is taller than [SC Ben tall]
\[ \text{Alice is} \text{taller than} \text{\textsubscript{SC} Ben} \]

b. than [SC Ben Δ]

Slavic standards that Pancheva argues are derived from small clauses bear fixed (genitive)
\[ \text{case and lack overt } \text{wh-operators, in contrast with structures like (32), which Pancheva} \]
analyzes as involving a full clause in the standard.

(32) *Germann* byl sil’nee [CP čem (byl) ego protivnik]
\[ \text{Germann}\text{\textsubscript{nom}} \text{was} \text{stronger} \text{\textsubscript{instr} what} \text{\textsubscript{gen} ego} \text{adversarynom} \]
‘Germann was stronger than his adversary.’ (Pancheva, 2006, (10a))

While a small clause account still treats standards as truly clausal structures, albeit of a
\[ \text{smaller size, Pancheva suggests that it can explain certain differences between (30) and} \]
\[ \text{(32) while making it possible to maintain a single quantificational entry (23) for Slavic} \]
\[ \text{comparative markers.} \]

In section 4, we consider the syntactic and semantic analysis of Navajo standards
of comparison. To preview, we argue that by syntactic diagnostics, Navajo standards
do not have reduced full clauses as their syntactic source. At the same time, we present
evidence from quantificational standards that Navajo standard markers are quantificational
expressions that take sets of degrees, rather than entities, as argument. The kind of
\[ \text{narrative that this suggests for Navajo is thus quite similar to the narrative that Pancheva} \]
\[ \text{explores for Slavic, namely how to reconcile quantificational comparative morphemes with} \]
\[ \text{standards that are not derived from full clauses. Nevertheless, a small clause account} \]
\[ \text{is a non-starter for Navajo. In contrast with Slavic and many other languages, there is} \]
\[ \text{no evidence that small clause structures exist in Navajo: All Navajo clauses consist of the} \]
\[ \text{same minimal element, namely a fully-inflected verb marked for all nominal arguments and} \]
\[ \text{temporal information. Appealing to a small clause structure in only Navajo comparatives} \]
\[ \text{seems very stipulative. Thus, our focus as we develop an analysis in section 5.1 will be} \]
\[ \text{whether we can maintain a quantificational entry for comparative (standard) markers while} \]
\[ \text{not appealing to any clausal structure in the standard.} \]

3.2 Diagnostics

There exist a number of structures that have been taken to support a phrasal analysis
(syntax and semantics) over a clausal one, and vice versa. While some of these diagnostics
were originally discussed for English \[ \text{Hankamer 1973, Heim 1985, Kennedy 1997,} \]
\[ \text{we will illustrate them as applied to Hindi-Urdu by Bhatt & Takahashi 2011, who argue} \]
\[ \text{that only a phrasal analysis is appropriate for Hindi-Urdu. Hindi-Urdu comparatives are} \]
\[ \text{at least superficially similar to Navajo comparatives, making their comparison potentially} \]
Like Navajo, Hindi-Urdu forms comparatives by marking a nominal standard of comparison with a postposition. The postposition -se is also found outside of comparative constructions to express temporal and locative notions of ‘from’ (Bhatt & Takahashi 2011, 591).

(33) John [DP Bill]-se (zyaadaa) lambaa hai.  
John Bill-than more tall.MASC.SG be.PRES.SG  
‘John is taller than Bill.’

The first diagnostic concerns the acceptability of multiple phrases within the standard of comparison. Hindi-Urdu does not permit the standard to contain any expression in addition to the DP. In the following example, a temporal adverb is permitted in the main clause but rejected in the standard:

(34) *Tina-ne aaj Pim kal-se zyaadaa kitaaḇe paRh-i:  
Tina-ERG today Pim yesterday-than more books.FEM read-PERF.FEM.PL  
(Intended: ‘Tina read more books today than Pim yesterday.’)

The English translation shows that English, by contrast, permits multiple phrases in the standard of comparison. We expect the English sentence to be acceptable if the English standard derives from reduction of a full clause, which Bhatt & Takahashi (2011) argue it does. The absence of full clausal structure from Hindi-Urdu standards means that we correctly predict adverbs to be ungrammatical.

The second diagnostic concerns the availability of reflexive standards of comparison. Hankamer (1973), Hoeksema (1983), and Napoli (1983) observe for English that a reflexive bound by the subject cannot function as the standard in clear cases of clausal comparison (35-a). Reflexives become grammatical if the standard lacks any verbal material (35-b).

(35) a. *No girl is taller than herself is.  
   b. No girl is taller than herself.

Examples like these have been taken to suggest that English standards like (35-b) are phrasal and do not derive from the reduction of a full clausal standard. If the standard is a fully clause as in (35-a), herself will not be locally bound and thus is correctly predicted to  

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10 A class of diagnostics that we do not consider here looks at the case of nominal expressions in the standard. Certain case markers have been taken to indicate the presence or absence of reduced full clausal structure (Heim 1985, Pancheva 2006). Since Navajo does not have nominal case, however, these diagnostics will not be instructive.

11 Unlike Navajo, Hindi-Urdu sentences like (33) can optionally contain the morpheme zyaadaa glossed here as a comparative marker ‘more’. This morpheme becomes obligatory in certain comparative constructions, including comparisons of quantity. See discussion of its possible semantic function by Schwarzschild (2013).

12 The Hindi-Urdu facts may also have an explanation on a small clause account of standards (Pancheva 2006, 2010). Temporal adverbs would be blocked because of the absence of tense from small clauses. However, small clauses can contain other kinds of modifying phrases, e.g. I consider her unattractive drunk (Harley & Jung 2015). In contrast with Navajo, Hindi-Urdu has been independently claimed to possess small clauses (e.g. Shah 1995); if the Hindi-Urdu counterpart to, e.g. Even when she’s sober, Tina is louder than Pim drunk is grammatical, this would suggest a small clause treatment might be appropriate for the language.
be ungrammatical. A phrasal syntactic analysis of (35-b), on the other hand, puts \textit{herself} in the same clause as the coreferential subject, making the reflexive not only licensed but obligatory on usual binding-theoretic assumptions (Chomsky, 1981).

In Hindi-Urdu, by contrast, the standard in a \textit{se}-phrase can, and indeed must, be a reflexive form when it is coindexed with the subject of the gradable predicate. This configuration suggests that Hindi-Urdu standards do not involve the reduction of full clausal standards. \footnote{We note that Pancheva (2006) suggests that a small clause analysis is also consistent with these data: Reflexives seem to be licensed in small clauses, e.g. \textit{I consider myself lucky}. If so, then these Hindi-Urdu facts may be consistent with a treatment of standards either as simple DPs or as reduced small clauses.}

\begin{verbatim}
(36) koi-bhii apne [DP aap]-se / [DP us]-se j/si lambaa nahi: ho sak-taa can-HABITUAL.MASC.SG 'No one can be taller than himself.'
\end{verbatim}

The final diagnostic we highlight concerns quantifier scope in standards. Bhatt & Takahashi (2011) show that in an English sentence like (37), the universal quantifier is permitted to take scope within the standard of comparison. \footnote{Much has been written about quantifiers in English that appear to obligatorily scope outside of comparatives. See Gajewski (2008); Larson (1988); Schwarzschild & Wilkinson (2002); Heim (2006); Alrenga & Kennedy (2014); Fleisher (2010).}

(37) More students read every syntax paper than (read) every semantics paper.
\[ \approx \text{The number of students who read every syntax paper exceeds the number of students who read every semantics paper.} \]

This reading would arise from the following LF, as given in Beck et al. (2012):

\begin{verbatim}
(38) [ [\text{-er}_{\text{clausal}} [\text{than } [\lambda d. d-\text{many people read every semantics paper}]]] \\
[\lambda d. d-\text{many people read every syntax paper}]]
\end{verbatim}

Bhatt & Takahashi (2011) give the following translation into Hindi-Urdu for sentence (37).

(39) [har syntax paper] [har semantics paper]-se zyaada log\-\text{o-}ne paRh-aa.
\[ \approx \text{For every pair } \langle x, y \rangle \text{ of a syntax paper } x \text{ and a semantics paper } y, \text{ more people read } x \text{ than } y. \text{ (The least-read syntax paper was read by more people than any semantics paper) (paraphrase from Beck et al. 2012)} \]

In contrast with the English sentence, however, (39) only has a reading in which the universal quantifier is interpreted with scope above the comparative relation. This meaning can be paraphrased in terms of ‘pairwise comparison’ as shown above. This reading corresponds to the following LF (Beck et al. 2012):

\begin{verbatim}
(40) [every syntax paper \( \lambda x \) [every semantics paper \( \lambda y \) [\text{-er}_{\text{phrasal}} \text{than } y] \[\lambda d. \lambda z. d-\text{many people read } z]]]]
\end{verbatim}
This difference between English and Hindi-Urdu is expected if English permits clausal standards while Hindi-Urdu does not. In English, the quantificational phrase *every semantics paper* \(((e, t), t)\) must undergo Quantifier Raising, leaving behind a trace of appropriate type \((e)\) to compose with the unpronounced verb in the standard of comparison. Because QR can occur within the confines of the clausal standard of comparison, the quantificational phrase can take low scope with respect to the comparative operator. In Hindi-Urdu, by contrast, quantificational phrases cannot take scope within the standard of comparison. This makes sense if Hindi-Urdu has phrasal standards of comparison and the standard marker \(-se\) seeks a type \(e\) argument: *Every semantics paper* must QR out of the standard of comparison in order to resolve the type mismatch.\(^{16}\)

4 Applying the tests to Navajo

4.1 First impressions

This section considers evidence for two possible analyses of Navajo standards: A phrasal view and a reduced (full) clausal view; we will not consider a small clause analysis (Pancheva, 2006, 2010) since, as already noted, small clauses are not a structure for which there is independent motivation in Navajo grammar. With these options in mind, a phrasal analysis of Navajo standards immediately suggests itself when we consider simple degree constructions like those below. The standard marker \(-lááh\) obligatorily bears pronominal marking corresponding to the standard of comparison. On verbs we treated prefixes for objects and subjects as saturating argument positions of their host: Why not say that \(shi-\) in (41) saturates the first argument of \(-lááh\) phrasal?

(41) Alice \(shí-lááh\) \(áníłnééz\).
    Alice OBJ beyond 3SUBJ.tall
    ‘Alice is taller than me.’

But despite the initial appeal of a phrasal syntactic analysis, subcomparative-like structures like (42) have been previously used to motivate a clausal analysis for Navajo standards of comparison. Bogal-Allbritten (2013a, 2016) treats all Navajo standards as underlyingly clausal, extrapolating from complex structures like (42) to simple cases like (41).

(42) Ch’éétíin [bikáá’adání \(áníñéez\)-ígí] \(yí-lááh\) \(áníñítéél\).
    door table 3SUBJ.long-NMLZ 3OBJ-beyond 3SUBJ.wide
    ‘The door is wider than the table is long.’

As we will see next, however, despite the apparent existence of subcomparatives other diagnostics point away from a clausal analysis of the standard.

\(^{16}\)Hindi combines a universal quantifier \(sab\) with standard marker \(-se\) to translate superlatives prompts, as well. As expected, \(sab\) can only take high scope.

(i) Atif \(sab-se\) lambaa hai.
    Atif ALL-ABL tall be.PRES.SG
    ‘Atif is the tallest.’ (Lit: Atif is taller than everyone)
4.2 Evidence for syntactically phrasal standards

With respect to the majority of diagnostics applied by Bhatt & Takahashi (2011) to Hindi-Urdu, Navajo seems to pattern like a clear example of a language with phrasal standards of comparison. First, like Hindi-Urdu — and unlike English — Navajo disallows multiple phrases in the standard of comparison.

(43) *'Ahbínídáą' Alice 'alni’ni’ágādóó Ben yi-láah-go bááh likani yiyíyáą'.

Context: Alice ate 4 cookies this morning. Ben ate 2 cookies this afternoon. I tell you: Alice ate more cookies this morning than Ben ate this afternoon.

(43) is not ungrammatical because it compares quantities. Quantities can be compared as in (44), which differs from (43) only in the lack of adverbs.

(44) Alice Ben yi-láah-go bááh likani yiyíyáą’.

We can further conclude that (43) must be ungrammatical because of the temporal adverb 'ałní’ní’ágādóó ‘afternoon’ in the standard of comparison. The sentence again becomes grammatical if this adverb is removed:

(45) 'Ahbínídáą’ Alice Ben yi-láah-go bááh likani yiyíyáą’.

Second, Navajo postpositional standard markers can bear the the reciprocal object marker 'ahi-. We illustrate with the comparative standard marker -lááh as well as the equative standard marker -ee.

(46) Alice dóó Mary doo ‘ahi-lááh áñihnééz da.

We do not find examples of structures in which the enclitic standard marker -gi combines with a reciprocal object marker. Such structures seem to be ruled out for independent reasons, namely that Navajo lacks a non-affixal reciprocal pronoun (Willie 1991), which would be what -gi would need to attach to.

(47) Díí tsin ‘ah-oh neel’ą.

Lit: These sticks aren’t the same length.'
(47) 'ah-ee-níilnééz
  RECIP_OBJ-with-1PL_SUBJ.tall
  ‘We are equally tall.’  
  Lit. We are as tall as each other. 
  (Young & Morgan 1987, 54)

Reflexive and reciprocal object markers are obligatorily locally bound by an appropriate (i.e. non-singular) subject in Navajo (Willie 1991). The reciprocal marker in the following sentence cannot be replaced with a third-person marker without changing the meaning (i.e. ‘We are painting some third person(s).’).

(48) 'Ahiidleesh.
  RECIP_OBJ.1DL_SUBJ.paint.ipfv
  ‘We are painting each other.’  
  (Willie 1991, 34)

Thus, the grammaticality of reciprocal markers as standards of comparison suggests strongly that the standard of comparison should not be analyzed as a full clause, of which the standard is the subject.

4.3 Evidence from the scope of a quantificational standard

A phrasal treatment of Navajo standards is challenged, however, by comparatives with indefinite standards, used to express superlative meaning. Navajo lacks a single superlative marker comparable to English -est but instead translates superlative prompts by combining the comparative standard marker -lááh seen above with an object prefix of the shape ‘a. Superlative meaning arises regardless of the morphological form of the adjectival verb (e.g. 'áníłnééz vs. nineez).

Crucially, this sentence only has one meaning: Alice is taller than anyone else is. It cannot mean that there is someone whom Alice is taller than.

(49) a. Alice ‘a-lááh
  Alice UNSPEC_OBJ-beyond 3SUBJ.tall
  ‘Alice is tallest, Alice is taller than anyone.’

b. Alice ‘a-láah-go
  Alice UNSPEC_OBJ-beyond-SUB 3SUBJ.tall
  ‘Alice is tallest, Alice is taller than anyone.’

The ‘a- object marker can also be borne by the postpositional standard marker used in comparisons of inferiority, -'oh. The meaning here is identical to (49) except that the meaning is that Alice is shorter (less tall) than anyone else in the context.

(50) Alice ‘a-'oh
  Alice UNSPEC_OBJ-short.of 3SUBJ.tall
  ‘Alice is shortest.’  
  Lit: Alice is tall short of anyone.

19 This sentence has a true superlative interpretation in the sense that it means that the subject bears the property in question to a unique degree among all relevant competitors. That is, [49] does not merely express that Alice is tall to a high degree, but rather that she is taller than anyone else under comparison. This sentence was rejected in a context in which Alice and Ben were both exceptionally tall individuals but the same height as each other.
Young & Morgan (1987) refer to the 'a- prefix as the ‘unspecified’ or ‘indefinite’ object marker. Reflexes of 'a- with the same characteristics are found in other Athabaskan and Dene languages. In Navajo, 'a- occupies the same position in the morphological template otherwise associated with the kind of object markers we have already seen (Young & Morgan, 1987). As such, it is not possible for a verb to bear both 'a and a ‘normal’ object marker.

The 'a- prefix is by no means restricted to superlative constructions. Minimal pairs of verbs with unspecified objects ((a)-sentences) and third-person objects ((b)-sentences) are given below.

20
(51) a. Na’nilkaad. 
    UNSPEC_OBJ.3SUBJ.herd.IPfv 
    ‘S/he is herding (something).’

b. Neinilkaad. 
    3OBJ.3SUBJ.herd.IPfv 
    ‘S/he is herding it/them.’

(52) a. 'Asts’ééh. 
    UNSPEC_OBJ.1SUBJ.eat_mush.IPfv 
    ‘I am eating (something).’

b. Yists’ééh. 
    3OBJ.1SUBJ.eat_mush.IPfv 
    ‘I am eating it.’

The 'a- object marker is also found on postpositions outside of those used in superlative constructions.

21
(53) a. Shizhéé -ee nástaaz. 
    1POSS.father UNSPEC_OBJ-with 3SUBJ.wrap.up.PERF 
    ‘My father was wrapped up (in something).’

b. Shichee y-ee nástaaz. 
    1POSS.grandfather 3OBJ-with 3SUBJ.wrap.up.PERF 
    ‘My grandfather was wrapped up in it.’

Replacing a regular object marker with 'a- has two concrete effects. First, the use of 'a- blocks the use of verb-external nominal expressions, which are unremarkable with regular object markers.

(54) a. 'Ashkii (*dibé) na’nilkaad. 
    boy sheep UNSPEC_OBJ.3SUBJ.herd.IPfv 
    ‘The boy is herding.’

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20 As the translations suggest, the verb stem may impose particular kinds of physical attributes on both regular and unspecified objects to have particular physical attributes. For example, the verb stem tsééh requires that the patient of the verb be mushy matter; thus, the unspecified object in (52-a) must be mushy even though it does not refer to any particular mushy matter in particular as the object marker in (52-b) does. See Fernald & Willie (2001) for discussion.

21 The 'a- prefix surfaces as a glottal stop here.
b. 'Ashkii dibé neinilkad.
   boy sheep 3OBJ.3SUBJ.herd.IPFV
   'The boy is herding sheep.'

Second, if a verb bears the 'a- object prefix, a subsequent verb bearing a regular object prefix cannot refer back to the object involved in the event described by the first verb (Fernald et al., 2000).

(55) 'Ashkii léi na’nílkaad. #Éí táididoogish.
   boy INDEF UNSPEC_OBJ.3SUBJ.herd.IPFV that.one 3OBJ.3SUBJ.shear.FUT
   'A boy is herding. He will shear it/them.'

On the basis of these two behaviors, Fernald et al. (2000); Fernald & Perkins (2018) propose to treat 'a- as a valency reducing affix rather than a referential pronoun of the kind denoted by other subject and object prefixes in the language. We give 'a- the following general meaning (compare Dowty’s (1978) rule for Unspecified Object Deletion): 'a- reduces the valency of the predicate to which it applies through existential closure.

(56) Given a predicate $P$ and arguments $x,y,...,z \leadsto \lambda x . \lambda y . \lambda z . P(x,y,...,z)$, then
   'a-$P \leadsto \lambda y . \lambda z . \exists x . P(x,y,...,z)$

The prefix 'a- seems to saturate only internal argument positions of verbs, e.g. object positions as in the examples above, or subject arguments of unaccusative verbs (e.g. arrive). This distribution is consistent with 'a- being a valency reducing morpheme of the relevant sort. Example (57) illustrates composition of na’nílkaad ‘s/he is herding (something)’ through composition between the unspecified object marker ‘a and verb (or verb stem) followed by composition with the third-person pronominal subject.

(57) na’nílkaad,  
   UNSPEC_OBJ.3SUBJ.herd.IPFV

   \sim \exists x . \text{herd}(x,v_i)

With this in hand, we return to the superlative construction. We stated above that (49) cannot be used in a context in which there is a particular individual who Alice is taller than. However, this is precisely the truth conditions that are generated if we assign -lááh the denotation associated above with phrasal standards.

(58) a. -lááhphrasal \sim \lambda y . \lambda g(d,et) . \lambda x . \text{MAX} (\lambda d . g(x,d)) > \text{MAX} (\lambda d . g(y,d))
   b. 'a-lááh \sim \lambda g(d,et) . \lambda x . \exists y . \text{MAX} (\lambda d . g(x,d)) > \text{MAX} (\lambda d . g(y,d))
   c. Alice 'a-lááh ‘ánñnééz \sim
      \exists y . \text{MAX} (\lambda d . \text{tall}(Alice,d)) > \text{MAX} (\lambda d . \text{tall}(y,d))
True iff there exists some $y$, such that Alice’s maximal degree of height exceeds the maximal degree of height of $y$

If we instead permit Navajo to have clausal standards of comparison, we generate the right meaning. In the following derivation, ‘$a$’ composes with the unpronounced copy of the gradable predicate in the standard of comparison and so has low scope.\[25\]

\[(59) \quad \begin{align*}
\text{a. } \text{-lááh}_{\text{clausal}} & \leadsto \lambda D_{(d.t)} . \lambda D'_{(d.t)} . \max(D') > \max(D) \\
\text{b. Alice ‘$a$-lááh ‘áníłnééz } & \leadsto \\
& \max(\lambda d . \text{tall}(\text{Alice},d)) > \max(\lambda d . \exists y . \text{tall}(y,d))
\end{align*}\]

True iff Alice’s maximal degree of height exceeds the maximal degree $d$ such that for any $y$, $y$ is tall to $d$.\[25\]

These results strongly suggest not only that Navajo can have a quantificational semantics for standard markers such as ‘-lááh’, but furthermore that they must. Admitting a phrasal semantics for ‘-lááh’ would predict a high scope indefinite reading to be available for sentences in which ‘$a$’ functions as the standard of comparison. Although ‘$a$’ might seem like a prime candidate for a phrasal semantics for the standard marker — as ‘$a$’ consists of a nominal affix and nothing more — we never find ‘$a$’ being interpreted with scope over the comparative relation. However, this conclusion about the semantics of ‘-lááh’ and, by extension, other standard markers is in apparent conflict with earlier evidence that supported a phrasal syntax for the standard. The goal of the analysis will be to resolve this conflict.

4.4 Ruling out an alternative view of ‘$a$’

We motivated a quantificational semantics for the standard marker ‘-lááh’ by appealing to a particular analysis of prefix ‘$a$’ as a valency-reducing existential closure operation. Before considering how to reconcile the semantic and syntactic claims made above, let us first briefly entertain an alternative analysis of ‘$a$’ which would be compatible with a phrasal entry for ‘-lááh’.\[26\] The idea would be to treat ‘$a$’ as ambiguous between a positive polarity item with existential force and a negative polarity item with universal force. The PPI form of ‘$a$’ would be used in simple non-negated expressions like (60), repeated from above. The existential quantifier ‘$a$’ would presumably undergo Quantifier Raising, leaving behind a type $e$ trace. The resulting meaning would be identical to what we obtained on our earlier analysis.

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\[25\]As given, the truth conditions for [69] are trivially false: Alice (a potential $y$) cannot be taller than herself. But verbs with ‘$a$’ in place of a regular object prefix cannot generally describe the subject acting upon herself. Instead, the reflexive object marker (high tone, ‘á-’) must be used, e.g. ‘ádéshjol ‘I am drying myself.’ Thus, there seems to be a general requirement that the domain of entities quantified over by unspecified marker ‘$a$’ be distinct from other actors in the sentence.

\[26\]We thank Michael Yoshitaka Erlewine and Louise McNally for bringing this alternative view to our attention.
The NPI form of ‘a-’ would occur both in the scope of negation and in standards of comparison, which is also a downward-entailing environment. As an NPI, ‘a-’ would denote a universal quantifier; see [Shimoyama 2011] for discussion of NPIs in Japanese with universal force argued to scope obligatorily above licensing negation. Like Japanese NPIs, Navajo NPI ‘a-’ would undergo Quantifier Raising and would be interpreted with scope above the comparative relation:

\[(61) \quad \forall y. \max(\lambda d. \text{tall}(v_i, d)) > \max(\lambda d. \text{tall}(y, d))\]

The truth conditions in (61) \((\forall y > \sim)\) are equivalent to the truth conditions in (59) \((\sim > 3)\). But while treating ‘a-’ as an NPI would allow us to maintain a phrasal entry for ‘lááh, such an analysis faces challenges which we believe rule it out from further consideration. First, this analysis forces us to make certain stipulative assumptions about ‘a-’: Not only must we posit ambiguity for ‘a-’, but we have to allow ‘a-’ to undergo covert quantifier raising. While such a move may be unproblematic for a scrambling language like Japanese, Navajo is reported to have fixed scope ([Fernald et al. 2000] [Bogal-Allbritten & Moulton, 2017]). Furthermore, scope of verbal affixes is claimed to be particularly rigid across the entire Athabaskan family ([Rice 2000]). We would have to say that NPI ‘a-’ is unique among Navajo morphemes in its ability to undergo covert movement.

Second, the distribution of ‘a-’ seems to be limited to internal argument positions. While this restriction is unsurprising on an analysis that treats ‘a-’ as a valency-reducing morpheme, it has no explanation on an account of ‘a-’ as a polarity item. Maintaining a polarity item analysis of ‘a-’ would mean stipulating its distribution.

Finally, if we posit ambiguity for ‘a-’, it is not clear how to restrict the distribution of PPI existential ‘a-. If movement of quantificational ‘a-’ is available, then why can a sentence like (61) not contain an instance of PPI existential ‘a-’ that has raised out of the scope of negation? Such a structure would have the truth conditions repeated in (62), which we have already established as unavailable.

\[(62) \quad \exists y. \max(\lambda d. \text{tall}(v_i, d)) > \max(\lambda d. \text{tall}(y, d))\]

True iff there exists some \(y\), such that Alice’s maximal degree of height exceeds the maximal degree of height of \(y\)

With these considerations in hand, we set aside this alternative view of ‘a-’ and turn now to how we might reconcile syntactically phrasal standards with quantificational entries for standard markers in Navajo.
5 Quantificational standard markers, but phrasal standards

5.1 Proposal

We have seen evidence that suggests that Navajo standards are phrasal and part of the same clause as the rest of the degree construction, rather than deriving from reduced clausal structure. Nevertheless, we have also seen two kinds of evidence that challenge this view. First, subcomparatives; we will return to their analysis in sec. 5.2 where we argue that they in fact do not challenge a phrasal analysis. The second piece of evidence is the obligatory low scope of quantificational prefix 'a-' in Navajo superlative constructions. This latter challenge is central to our main claim in this paper: Navajo standard markers must have quantificational entries. We represent the class of standard markers with -lááh, but the proposals made here should be able to be generalized to all postpositions and enclitics used in degree constructions.

(63)  -läáh \sim \lambda D_{(d,t)} \lambda D'_{(d,t)} \cdot \text{MAX}(D') > \text{MAX}(D)

Nevertheless, we will maintain that Navajo standards are syntactically phrasal.

In order to reconcile a quantificational semantics with a phrasal treatment of standards, we will need to associate the entities denoted by standard phrases with properties of degrees without adding actual clausal structure in the process. We propose that composition between an entity-denoting standard and a quantificational standard marker is mediated by \textsc{meas}, a null functional head. We adopt the entry assigned to \textsc{meas} by Solt (2009); see Rett (2014) for an entry that differs only in the order in which degree and entities are taken as argument.

(64)  \textsc{meas} \sim \lambda x \cdot \lambda d \cdot \mu_{\text{dim}}(x) \geq d \quad \text{(Solt 2009 105)}

The measure function \( \mu_{\text{dim}} \) associates an entity \( x \) with a set of degrees \( \langle d, t \rangle \) on a scale along some dimension. We return below to consider the valuation of \text{dim}. In other applications of \textsc{meas}, the dimension is taken to be constrained by the material it combines with (e.g. noun, measure phrase) but also shaped by context (Schwarzschild 2002; Solt 2009; Rett 2014). Measurement operators are perhaps best known for being the semantic ‘glue’ which enables composition between nouns and measure phrases or numerals (e.g. \textit{six cats, 5cm paperclips}), as well as between nouns and quantity adjectives (e.g. \textit{many}) on analyses that treat them as relations between degrees and intervals (Solt 2009, 2015; Rett 2008, 2014; Wellwood 2015, among others). Measurement operators are perhaps best known for being the semantic ‘glue’ which enables composition between nouns and measure phrases or numerals (e.g. \textit{six cats, 5cm paperclips}), as well as between nouns and quantity adjectives (e.g. \textit{many}) on analyses that treat them as relations between degrees and intervals (Solt 2009, 2015; Rett 2008, 2014; Wellwood 2015, among others). For us, the role of \textsc{meas} is also to mediate between an entity and a degree expression, in this case standard marker -läáh.

We illustrate the application of \textsc{meas} in Navajo degree constructions with the following simple sentence:
The standard of comparison is the third-person pronominal prefix yi-. Composition of yi- with the measurement operator MEAS produces a set of degrees along some scale which are associated with the referent of this pronoun.

\[
\text{MEAS } yi \sim \lambda d . \mu_{\text{DIM}}(v_i) \geq d
\]

The set of degrees that is produced then composes with the standard marker -lááh.

\[
-\text{lááh } [\text{MEAS } yi] \sim \lambda D'_{(d, t)} . \text{MAX}(D') \geq \text{MAX}(\lambda d . \mu_{\text{DIM}}(v_i)) \geq d
\]

The second set of degrees taken by -lááh is contributed by material from the main clause. The gradable predicate 'áníłnééz bears a subject prefix which we have taken to saturate the entity argument position of the verb. We use the same simplification introduced earlier and show direct composition between the verb and Alice, the verb-external nominal expression which will ultimately come to value the subject pronominal prefix. The set of degrees to which Alice is tall is taken as argument by yi1-lááh as it was defined in (67).

\[
\text{Alice } yi1-\text{lááh } 'áníłnééz } \sim \\
\text{MAX}(\lambda d . \text{height}(Alice)) \geq d > \text{MAX}(\lambda d . \mu_{\text{DIM}}(v_i)) \geq d
\]

True iff the maximal degree to which Alice is tall exceeds the maximal degree associated with the referent of yi

The dimension associated with MEAS is still unspecified in our truth conditions above, but it seems reasonable to assume that in a sentence like (65), the most accessible meaning is one in which \( \mu \) is equated with the measure function from the main clause gradable predicate, namely \text{height}.

We now turn to the analysis of Navajo translations of superlative prompts, as repeated in (69):

\[
\text{Alice } 'a-\text{lááh } 'áníłnééz } \sim \\
\text{MAX}(\lambda d . \text{height}(Alice)) \geq d > \text{MAX}(\lambda d . \mu_{\text{DIM}}(v_i)) \geq d
\]

The unspecified object prefix 'a- composes first with MEAS. Composition returns the set of degrees \( d \) such that for any \( y \), \( d \) is a degree associated with \( y \) on some scale with some dimension to be determined.

\[
'a \text{ MEAS } \sim \lambda d . \exists y . \mu_{\text{DIM}}(y) \geq d
\]

This set of degrees is then taken as argument by the standard marker -lááh, just as before. The second set of degrees taken as argument by -lááh is determined by application of the main clause gradable predicate to the subject. Keeping the same notational simplifications from above in place, the final truth conditions are as follows. We once again assume that the measure function \( \mu \) in MEAS is identified with the measure function, \text{height}, from the
gradable predicate in the main clause.  

\begin{equation} 
\text{Alice } 'a-lááh áññnéez \rightarrow \text{MAX}(\lambda d. \text{height}(\text{Alice}) \geq d) > \text{MAX}(\lambda d. \exists y \cdot \mu_{\text{DIM}}(y) \geq d) \end{equation}

True iff the maximal degree to which Alice is tall exceeds the maximal degree to which any \(y\) is tall.

We recognize there to be a slight mismatch in morphological and semantic bracketing here. Although the prefixes \(yi\)- and \( 'a\)- are taken as argument by MEAS, they are nevertheless morphologically realized as prefixes to the standard marker -lááh. A preference for matching the Logical Form with morphological bracketing might suggest that these two elements compose directly, as would be the case if -lááh had a non-quantificational meaning. But while regular object markers like \(yi\)- could in principle compose directly with -lááh so defined and still yield the right truth conditions, we have seen that the the same is not true for 'a'. If 'a' composes directly with -lááh, only the unattested high scope reading for 'a' is expected. We assume that \(yi\)- and 'a' are realized as prefixes on -lááh despite composing first with MEAS because MEAS is not overt and therefore not an eligible host for prefixes.

Our account of Navajo is similar in spirit to the small clause account of certain Slavic comparatives developed by Pancheva (2006, 2010), who argues that it is possible to maintain a quantificational denotation for comparative markers without appealing to a full clausal syntax for standards of comparison. However, our analysis crucially differs from

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27Our analysis of Navajo expressions of superlative meaning suggests another reason to avoid an alternative analysis on which -lááh is not of quantificational determiner type but is instead type \(d, ((d, t), t)\), where its first argument is obtained by prior application of an independent \textsc{max} operator to the standard of comparison. von Stechow (1984), Rullmann (1995), Heim (2001). Earlier, we suggested that while such an approach may make sense for languages in which we find a standard marker (and/or \textit{wh}-operator) in addition to a comparative morpheme, it is not parsimonious for Navajo, where we seem to only have a comparative operator at our disposal: Why not put all meaning related to comparison in the entry of a quantificational -lááh, then, as we have done?

However, there is another kind of analysis that would be consistent with a type \(d, ((d, t), t)\) meaning for -lááh. What if we instead define MEAS as a measure function \((e, d)\) as Wellwood (2015) does? This measure function would apply to entity-denoting standards and return the (maximal) degree associated with that entity along some scale. Thus, there would be no need to posit an extra \textsc{max} operator, which we found unappealing above. However, this alternative treatment of MEAS cannot be integrated with our analysis: As we have defined 'a' as an existential closure operation, it must compose with a set-type expression (i.e. the type ends in ...\(t\)). We see no coherent way to define 'a'-such that it can compose with a measure function-type MEAS. This is, then, another strike against a type \(d, ((d, t), t)\) treatment of Navajo standard markers.

28Crucially, the truth conditions are incorrect for 'a-lááh' if we assume direct composition regardless of which entry we assign to -lááh. We have already seen that this is true for the phrasal analysis in (58-c) (i) demonstrates that the truth conditions are still wrong if -lááh is instead given a quantificational meaning but nevertheless composes with 'a'-directly:

\begin{enumerate}
  \item \( -lááh \rightarrow \lambda D_{(d, t)} \cdot \lambda \text{MAX}(D) > \text{MAX}(D) \)
  \item \( 'a-lááh \rightarrow \lambda D_{(d, t)} \cdot \exists \text{MAX}(D') > \text{MAX}(D) \)
  \item \( \text{Alice 'a-lááh áññnéez} \rightarrow \exists D_{(d, t)} \cdot \text{MAX}(\lambda d. \text{tall}(\text{Alice}, d)) > \text{MAX}(D) \)
\end{enumerate}

'There exists a set of degrees D. Alice is taller than the maximal degree in this set.'
Pancheva’s in that MEAS does not introduce (even small) clausal structure of the sort that might, for instance, license adverbs in the standard of comparison. As we noted already, it is not easy to see how a small clause account could be applied directly to Navajo, since there is no evidence that this is a structure in the language: All Navajo clauses consist of the same minimal element, namely a fully-inflected verb marked for all nominal arguments and temporal information. As such, we have developed an account that maintains quantificational entries for comparative (standard) markers while continuing to treat standards as syntactically phrasal.

5.2 Accounting for subcomparatives

Subcomparatives like (72) and (73) originally motivated [Bogal-Allbritten 2013a, 2016] to assume that Navajo must permit clausal standards.

(72) Ch’é’étiin [bikáá’adání ’ánílnéez]-ígíí yi-lááh ’áníltéél.
     door       table    3SUBJ.long-NMLZ 3OBJ-beyond 3SUBJ.wide
     ‘The door is wider than the table is long.’

(73) Ch’é’étiin [bikáá’adání ’ánílnéez]-í-gi    ’áníltéél.
     door       table    3SUBJ.long-NMLZ-at 3SUBJ.wide
     ‘The door is as wide as the table is long.’

While [Bogal-Allbritten 2013a, 2016] did not assign any particular semantic function to -ígíí, it clearly plays some kind of key role in these sentences. If we remove -ígíí (or its morphological variant -í seen in (73)), the structure becomes ungrammatical, e.g.:

(74) *Ch’é’étiin [bikáá’adání ’ánílnéez] yi-lááh ’áníltéél.
     door       table    3SUBJ.long 3OBJ-beyond 3SUBJ.wide

The marker -ígíí is also found on structures previously analyzed as internally-headed relative clauses [Platero 1974, Willie 1989].

(75) [K’ad ’ashkii ’aháá’]-ígíí yádooltih.
     now       boy       3SUBJ.snore/IPFV-NMLZ 3SUBJ.speak.FUT
     ‘The boy who is snoring right now will speak.’ (adapt. Platero 1974)

While the bracketed material above is clearly clausal, the addition of -ígíí allows it to function in positions that can otherwise be occupied by e.g. proper names, viz. Alice yádooltih ‘Alice will speak’.

On our analysis of standards developed above, MEAS composed with an entity and returned a property of degrees. In sentences like (75), the ígíí-marked clause appears to function in an argument position, where we would expect to find type e expressions. Why not, then, claim that the ígíí-marked clauses in subcomparatives also denote a simple type d expression? Under this view, we could treat -ígíí as either a choice function or iota operator, which would apply to a set of degrees (as would be denoted by a gradable predicate inflected for subject) and return a single degree. We illustrate with an iota...
As we have defined \(-\text{lááh}\), it is not able to compose directly with a type \(d\) expression. However, we can obtain a property of degrees if we also permit \(\text{meas}\) to take a degree as first argument (77). Ambiguity between \(\text{meas}\) as defined in (77) and the original entry in (64) has precedent in Rett (2014).

(77) \[ \text{MEAS}_{\text{deg}} \rightarrow \lambda d. \lambda d'. \mu_{\text{dim}}(d) \geq d' \]

Application of \(\text{meas}\) as defined in (77) to the length \(d\) of the table would return a set of degrees along some dimension. This property of degrees would then go on to combine with \(-\text{lááh}\) and the rest of the clause in the familiar way. As before, we assume that the dimension associated with \(\mu\) is determined by the main clause gradable predicate. We illustrate below with the subcomparative structure from (72).

(78) \[ \text{Ch'é'étiin bikáá'adání 'áníłnééz-ígíí yi-lááh 'áníłtéél} \rightarrow \]
\[ \text{MAX}(\lambda d. \text{width}(\text{door}) \geq d) > \text{MAX}(\lambda d. \mu_{\text{dim}}(\nu d. \text{long}(\text{table})(d)) \geq d) \]

True iff the maximal degree to which the doorway is wide exceeds the maximal degree to which the table’s length is wide.

Intuitively, it is a bit odd to think about the width of a table’s length, but this oddness seems to be a result of the paraphrase rather than the meaning itself. Since degrees of length and width both involve the same kind of dimensional parameter — a notion of “linear extent” (Kennedy, 1997, 21) — there is no reason why a degree of length should not be able to be placed along the width scale. Reason to prefer a choice function treatment of \(\text{ígíí}\)-marked clauses comes from cases in which these expressions do not appear to have the semantic attributes of definite noun phrases, such as in (i) from Grosu (2012), attributed to Ellavina Perkins. We will, however, leave this issue open for the time being.

(i) \[ \text{Bilasáana hazhó'ó tánhágis-ígíí nisin.} \]
\[ \text{apple carefully be.washed-NMLZ 3SUBJ.1SUBJ.want/think} \]
\[ \text{I want an apple that is well-washed.} \]

The challenge will be to extend this view of \(\text{ígíí}\) to its use in internally-headed relative clauses as in (75). When \(-\text{ígíí}\) is used in subcomparatives, it takes a property of degrees as argument. In the case of (75) however, it seems like \(\text{ígíí}\) is combining with a complete clause rather than the type \((e, t)\) expression that it seems we would need in order for the entire \(\text{ígíí}\)-marked expression to denote an entity. One possible direction is to take our analysis of \(\text{ígíí}\) as it occurs in subcomparatives as basic and reconsider Bogal-Allbritten & Moulton’s (2017) analysis of Navajo internally-headed relative clauses as parallel to superficially similar structures in Japanese (Hoshi, 1995; Shimoyama, 1999). Instead, we might consider an account in which abstraction over one of the pronominal prefixes borne by the verb within the \(\text{ígíí}\)-marked clause. This process of abstraction would serve two functions: First, it would identify the head of the relative clause, and second it would create a property-type expression of the kind which \(\text{ígíí}\) can compose with. Precedent for this view of Navajo comes from Grosu (2012). However, we will leave resolution of this to future work.
This same entry for MEAS could also be used in measure phrase comparatives like (79), if we take measure phrases to denote degrees.31

(79) Alice hastádi ‘adées’eez yi-lááh ‘ániftso.
   Alice six feet 3OBJ-beyond 3SUBJ.big
‘Alice is taller than six feet.’

The idea is that MEAS would apply to the measure phrase to return a set of degrees along some dimension. This set of degrees would then go on to compose with -lááh and the rest of the clause. This would be reminiscent of Hackl’s (2000) analysis of measure phrase comparatives in English, which invokes an unpronounced quantity predicate in the standard of comparison. However, our account differs from Hackl’s in that we do not invoke true clausal structure in Navajo standards of comparison.

5.3 Valuation of the dimension associated with MEAS

To this point, we have only considered examples in which the main clause contained an overt gradable predicate. In our analysis of these structures, the dimension associated with MEAS was obligatorily equated with the dimension associated with the main clause gradable predicate. We have not found any evidence that a sentence like (80), for instance, can have a subcomparative interpretation, where the MEAS operator that composes with the standard is associated with a different dimension than the main clause predicate.

(80) Ch’éétiin bikáå’adání yi-lááh ‘ániftél.
   door table 3OBJ-beyond 3SUBJ.wide
‘The door is wider than the table.’

The apparent requirement that the dimension of MEAS match the dimension used in the main clause strongly recalls the anaphoric predicate in Pancheva’s (2006) small clause

31 If measure phrases instead denote intervals (as in Schwarzschild & Wilkinson (2002) and others), they could compose directly with -lááh.

32 Peter Alrenga (p.c.) suggests that this reading could be avoided if -lááh were redefined such that it takes the gradable predicate g as argument. The effect of this would essentially be to combine the standard marker with MEAS, where g would determine the dimension. We see three challenges for such an approach. First, gradable predicates do not compose directly with comparative markers in Navajo; on our assumptions in section 2, obligatory composition with pronominal subject markers results in gradable predicates denoting sets of degrees at the point at which they compose with -lááh. Second, as we see in (81), there are at least some constructions where context, rather than a gradable predicate, appears to determine the dimension. Finally, it is a challenge to define -lááh in such a way that it composes directly with the gradable predicate while also avoiding the undesirable high scope interpretation for existential ‘a-. One imaginable possibility is to define -lááh so that it composes directly with a quantifier (i). If we adopt (i), we will have to typeshift all standards other than ‘a- (i.e. pronominal prefixes) from type e to type (e, t, t).

(i)   -lááh = λq(e, dt). λQ(ε, τ). λD(d, t). max(D) > max(Ad. Q(λx. g(x, d)))

Given these challenges and the absence of compelling independent reasons to pursue this alternative analysis, we set it aside here.
analysis of standards of comparison. Pancheva proposes that the anaphoric predicate is valued when the main clause predicate is copied at LF. A similar process could apply in Navajo to value the dimension of MEAS when the main clause contains a gradable predicate.\textsuperscript{33}

At the same time, we expect that in the absence of a gradable predicate, the dimension of MEAS can be supplied by context, as is possible for MEAS in its other uses (Schwarzschild, 2006; Solt, 2009; Rett, 2014). This expectation appears to be borne out. Ellavina Perkins volunteered the following sentence when asked her about structures like (43) where the standard should contain a temporal adverb. In the context, it is clear that we are comparing quantities of cookies, and that is the interpretation that we get. There is no overt gradable predicate, however:

(81) 'Ahhbíní́ą́ą́' Alice bááh likání yiyí́yíą́ą́-ígíí Ben 'alntíí'áádxóó
morning Alice cookie 3OBJ.3SUBJ.eat.PERF-NMLZ Ben afternoon
yiyí́yíą́ą́-ígíí t'áa b'i-lááh.
3OBJ.3SUBJ.eat.PERF-NMLZ just 3OBJ-beyond
Lit. The cookies that Alice ate this morning are more than the cookies that Ben ate this afternoon.
Prompt: Alice ate 4 cookies this morning. Ben ate 2 cookies this afternoon. I tell you: Alice ate more cookies this morning than Ben ate this afternoon.

If we take each ígíí-marked clause to denote a plurality of cookies — which we treat here as type e for the sake of illustration — an instance of MEAS would have to apply to each to yield the sets of degrees to be taken as argument by -lááh. In the context given, it was clear that we were comparing quantities of cookies. It makes sense, then, if \( \mu_{\text{dim}} \) projects entities onto the quantity scale.

(82) a. \( \text{MEAS}[x.x \text{ is cookies that Alice ate this morning}] \sim \lambda d. \mu_{\text{dim}}(\text{Alice-cookies}) \geq d \)

b. \( \text{MEAS}[x.x \text{ is cookies that Ben ate this afternoon}] \sim \lambda d. \mu_{\text{dim}}(\text{Ben-cookies}) \geq d \)

c. \( -\text{lááh}[\lambda d. \mu_{\text{dim}}(\text{Ben-cookies}) \geq d] \langle \lambda d. \mu_{\text{dim}}(\text{Alice-cookies}) \geq d \rangle \sim \max(\lambda d. \mu_{\text{dim}}(\text{Alice-cookies})(d)) > \max(\lambda d. \mu_{\text{dim}}(\text{Ben-cookies})(d)) \)

The potential flexibility of such examples remains underinvestigated, however. Future work must in particular ask if other dimensions can be made sufficiently salient given an appropriate context. Our invocation of MEAS makes the prediction that while context assist in determining the dimension, only monotonic dimensions will be available: Application of MEAS to other constructions demonstrates a general monotonicity restriction (Schwarzschild, 2006; Solt, 2009; Rett, 2014). We leave further investigation of this point for Navajo to future work.

\textsuperscript{33}Pancheva (2006) does not provide more detail on this process; crucially, we do not mean a process by which clausal structure is copied at LF, but rather one which values the dimension of MEAS.
5.4 Scope of standard phrases

On our proposal, standard phrases in Navajo denote generalized quantifiers over degrees (type \(\langle (d, t), t \rangle\)).

\[
yi_i\text{-lāáh} \rightarrow \lambda D'_{(d,t)} \cdot \max(D') > \max(\lambda d \cdot \mu_{d_{\text{DIM}}}(v_i) \geq d)
\]

As Heim (2001) discusses, Kennedy (1997) questions quantificational analyses of comparative structure given the absence of readings that we might expect if degree quantifiers can take scope with respect to other operators in the way that quantifiers over entities can. However, Heim argues that the apparent lack of scope-taking behavior by comparative structures does not necessarily rule against a quantificational analysis. Instead, she argues that many of the missing expected ambiguities can be attributed to certain systematic equivalence in truth conditions of sentences which might mask different heights of interpretation for degree quantifiers. As she writes, these cases are consistent with a theory in which degree quantifiers can take high scope, as well as a theory in which they never move past the first position where they can be interpreted.

Heim suggests that the clearest cases where true scope ambiguities can be detected are exactly-differentials, of the shape in (84):

\[
\text{(84) John is 4' tall. Every girl is exactly 1" taller than that.}
\]

a. \(\forall x. (girl)(x) \rightarrow \max\{d : \text{tall}(x, d)\} = 4' + 1"\)

\(\approx\) For every girl \(x\), the maximum degree to which \(x\) is tall is 49". Every girl is precisely 49" tall.

b. \(\max\{d : \forall x. \text{girl}(x) \rightarrow \text{tall}(x, d)\} = 4' + 1"

\(\approx\) The maximal degree \(d\) to which every girl is (at least) \(d\)-tall is 49". The shortest girl is exactly 49" tall.

Such examples get complex to construct very quickly in Navajo since differential measure phrases are expressed using additional postpositional phrases, and have not yet been tested systematically.

Meanwhile, however, we can offer a few thoughts on what we might say if we do, ultimately, find that Navajo standard phrases are interpreted with lowest possible scope. Following Heim (2001), we suggest that this would not rule against a quantificational account of standard markers but would instead suggest that other factors in Navajo grammar are limiting scope possibilities. One such factor comes immediately to mind. As Bogal-Allbritten (2013a, 2016) discusses at length, adjectival verbs of a certain morphological form — the form used in most examples in this paper — impose tight locality restrictions on the position of the standard phrase. While the negation frame doo...da typically occurs directly adjacent to the verb (Faltz 2000), we see in (85) that the equative standard phrase cannot be separated from the adjectival verb even by negation.

\[
\text{(85) a. *Alice Ben-gi doo 'áníłnééz.}
\]

\(\text{Alice Ben-at NEG 3SUBJ.tall NEG (Intended: 'Alice is not as tall as Ben.'\}}\)

b. Alice doo Ben-gi 'áníłnééz.
Alice NEG Ben-at 3SUBJ.tall NEG
‘Alice is not as tall as Ben.’

This contrasts with the normal flexibility in word order found for most verb-external expressions, in particular locative phrases used with non-adjectival verbs:

(86) Baa’ (Kinlání-di biyáázh (Kinlání-di) naahnish.
Baa’ Flagstaff-LOC 3POSS.son Flagstaff-LOC 3SUBJ.work.IPFV
‘Bah’s son works in Flagstaff.’ (Fritz 2000, 38-39)

Navajo seems to exhibit rigid surface scope with respect to other elements that might be treated as scope-bearing, such as the indefinite expression la’ and negation as shown below [Bogal-Allbritten & Moulton 2017].

(87) a. La’ t’áadoo yíyá’ da.
INDEF NEG 3OBJ.3SUBJ.eat.PERF NEG
‘There was something I didn’t eat.’
b. T’áadoo la’ yíyá’ da.
NEG INDEF 3OBJ.3SUBJ.eatPERF NEG
‘I didn’t eat anything.’

Putting these pieces together, we may not find the kinds of ambiguities one might expect given quantificational meanings for standard phrases since Navajo both has rigid surface scope and imposes certain restrictions on the position of standard phrases. With respect to the search for scope ambiguities, the kinds of cases to focus on in the future will be those adjectival verbs that [Bogal-Allbritten (2013b, 2016)] identifies as more permissive with respect to the position of standard phrases.

6 Conclusions and looking ahead: Quantification beyond degrees?

Our primary claim is that despite having a phrasal standards without reduced clausal structure, quantificational entries for Navajo standard markers are nonetheless appropriate given the scope of the existential prefix ‘a- in translations of superlative prompts. We can wed a phrasal syntax to quantificational entries like (88) if we allow a measurement operator MEAS to apply to type e (or d) standards and return a property of degrees.

(88) \[-lááh_{\text{clausal}} \sim \lambda D_{(d,t)} \cdot \lambda D'_{(d,t)} \cdot \text{MAX}(D') > \text{MAX}(D)\]

Our analysis of Navajo suggests a novel strategy that might be employed in natural language to reconcile quantificational meanings for comparative morphemes (or standard markers) even when there is evidence that standards of comparison lack clausal structure. Our proposal that Navajo has degree quantifiers of type $\langle(d,t),\langle(d,t),t\rangle\rangle$ is notable in light of prior claims that Navajo lacks true quantificational determiners. That is, it has been claimed that Navajo lacks expressions that form syntactic constituents with phrases that determine a property-type meaning that can serve as the restrictor to the quantifier
Faltz (1995, 2000; Speas & Parsons-Yazzie, 1996). Faltz observes, for instance, that the Navajo expression t’ááłá’í nítínígo is sometimes translated to English as ‘each’. In contrast with its English translation, however, this Navajo expression does not seem to form a constituent with the noun ‘awée’ ‘baby’ in the following sentences: The two expressions can be separated from each other by extraneous material, such as a temporal adverb.

(89) a. ‘Awée’ ’adáą́ą́dą́ą’ t’ááłá’í nítínígo deíłzhoh.  
   baby yesterday each PL.3OBJ.1SUBJ.tickle.PERF  
   ‘I tickled each baby yesterday.’

b. T’ááłá’í nítínígo ’adáą́ą́dą́ą’ ’awée’ deíłzhoh.  
   each yesterday baby PL.3OBJ.1SUBJ.tickle.PERF  
   ‘I tickled each baby yesterday.’ (Faltz, 1995, 294)

Speas & Parsons-Yazzie (1996) also observe that ‘ałtso, often translated into English as ‘every’, can occur on its own without a nominal expression, in which case it is translated as an adverbial expression.

(90) (ʼAlk’ésdisií) ’ałtso yiíąą’  
    candy all 1SUBJ-ate  
   ‘I ate it (the candy) all up.’ (adapt. Speas & Parsons-Yazzie, 1996, 44)

Examples like (90) were among the original cases that led Jelinek (1995) and authors in the seminal Bach et al. (1995) volume on quantification to propose that some languages imply lack quantificational determiners (D-quantification), contra Barwise & Cooper’s (1981) proposal that the kinds of structures and meanings involved in expressions like every or every cat are universally available.

One hypothesis for why Navajo lacks quantificational determiners could be that the Navajo language simply lacks the kinds of logical resources necessary to express meanings of the right kind. For instance, we might hypothesize Navajo to be a language with access only to first-order logic. In such a language, we would not expect to find quantificational determiners, which denote relations between sets of individuals and would therefore require access to second-order logic.

However, Faltz (1995, 2000) suggests that perhaps Navajo lacks quantificational determiners because of independent facts about its grammar. If we take seriously the idea that the argument positions of Navajo verbs are saturated by prefixes, a Navajo verb will never denote a type $\langle e, t \rangle$ expressions at the point at which it becomes ‘syntactically visible’, as Faltz puts it. Thus we do not find quantificational determiners because the kind of property-type expressions they need to compose with in the syntax are simply not present.

Our findings suggest that Faltz (1995, 2000) was exactly right in his reason for why Navajo lacks quantificational determiners over entities. We have argued that Navajo does, in fact, have quantificational expressions of that denote relations between two sets. However, this type may be limited to the domain of degrees. This is expected given the grammar of Navajo: There are no pronominal prefixes that saturate the degree arguments of gradable predicates, so the right kind of property-type meanings — and the quantificational meanings that depend on them — will be available in the domain of degrees.
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